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WINDSHIELD LEAFLETING ORDINANCES: A 
PERMISSIBLE USE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
AUTHORITY? 
Tony Bickel* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As “historic weapons in the defense of liberty,”1 leaflets have played 
a critical role in the United States.  In 1776, Thomas Paine’s pamphlet 
Common Sense argued for independence and sparked the American 
Revolution.2  The federal government also promoted the use of leaflets 
to advertise for war bond selling campaigns during World War II.3  The 
importance of leafleting lingered into the twentieth century, and in 1938, 
the Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment protected 
leafleting.4  However, the right to leaflet is not absolute.5 
The Supreme Court has addressed whether local governments may 
regulate the distribution of leaflets in several contexts, but has yet to 
address ordinances that prohibit windshield leafleting.  The issue pits a 
speaker’s First Amendment right to free speech against both a city’s 
esthetic interest in preventing litter and citizens’ private property 
interests in their vehicles.6  The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals 
 *   Associate Member, 2009–2010 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). 
 2. RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN, THE FOUNDING FATHERS RECONSIDERED 41 (2009).  Thomas 
Paine, a founding father of the United States, is most well-known for his pamphlet, Common Sense, 
which argued “that independence was desirable, well-deserved, and within reach.”  Id. at 41.  Many 
colonists read Common Sense, and it is considered to have played a pivotal role in igniting the 
Revolutionary War.  Id. 
 3. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (citations omitted). 
 4. See Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452 (“The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and 
periodicals.  It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets.”). 
 5. See Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he right to handbill is not 
absolute.”); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 809–10 (1984) 
(upholding ordinance that prohibited the placement of signs or leaflets on utility poles); Heffron v. Int’l 
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654–56 (1981) (upholding a restriction on 
leafleters to specific booths at a state fair); see also Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 155 (1939) 
(“[T]he right of free expression is not absolute but subject to reasonable regulation.”) (citation omitted); 
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (“[T]he peace, good order, and comfort of the 
community may imperatively require regulation of the time, place, and manner of [literature] 
distribution.”) (citation omitted). 
 6. See Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160 F.3d 1214, 1218–20 (8th Cir. 1998); Jobe v. City of 
Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d 261, 262–63 (6th Cir. 2005); Horina, 538 F.3d at 633; Klein v. City of San 
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are split on this issue.  The following Comment analyzes this 
controversy. 
Part II surveys the line of Supreme Court cases at the heart of the 
circuit split.  Part III then outlines each side of the circuit split.  Next, 
Part IV argues that local government bans on windshield leafleting are 
constitutional time, place, and manner restrictions.  Lastly, Part V urges 
the undecided circuits to adopt this position. 
II. SUPREME COURT BACKGROUND 
Windshield leafleting presents a conflict between the First 
Amendment right to distribute literature and a city’s interest both in 
maintaining a clean, esthetically appealing environment and in 
protecting a citizen’s private property.7  Considering these competing 
interests, the Supreme Court has addressed leafleting directly to persons 
in the streets,8 door-to-door leafleting,9 sending leaflets through the 
mail,10 and posting leaflets on public utility poles.11  The circuit courts 
are split regarding the proper interpretation of this line of cases and its 
application to windshield leafleting.12 
The Supreme Court first addressed leafleting in 1939 in Schneider v. 
New Jersey, which struck down several city bans on person-to-person 
leafleting on public streets.13  The cities argued that litter prevention 
justified the ordinance; the Court disagreed, holding that “the purpose to 
keep the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an 
ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from 
handing literature to one willing to receive it.”14  The Court further 
found that through general anti-litter laws, cities have other avenues of 
preventing litter, such as punishing “those who actually throw papers on 
the streets.”15 
Four years later, in Martin v. City of Struthers, the Court struck down 
Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 7. See discussion infra Part II. 
 8. See Schneider, 308 U.S. at 155 (involving a city’s right to prevent littering caused by 
leafleting directly to persons in the street). 
 9. See Martin, 319 U.S. at 144 (involving the property rights of a homeowner and door-to-door 
leafleting). 
 10. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 60 (1983) (regarding the property 
rights of a homeowner and the reception of mail). 
 11. See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 792–94 (1984) 
(regarding a city’s right to prevent visual blight from the posting of signs on utility poles). 
 12. See discussion infra Part III. 
 13. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162–63. 
 14. Id. at 162 (emphasis added). 
 15. Id. 
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a city ban on door-to-door leafleting.16  While recognizing an interest in 
protecting homeowners and indicating that “[c]onstant callers . . . may 
lessen the peaceful enjoyment of a home,”17 the Court noted that door-
to-door leafleting “is one of the most accepted techniques of seeking 
popular support” and “is essential to the poorly financed causes of little 
people.”18  The Court held that the burden is on the homeowner to first 
warn the speaker to stay off their property.19  The Court noted that after 
a homeowner warns a speaker to stay off their property, traditional 
trespass statutes effectively serve the government’s interest in protecting 
the homeowner from annoyance and crime.20 
In 1983, the Court returned to the competing interests of a speaker 
and homeowner in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.21  In Bolger, 
the Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited mailing unsolicited 
leaflets concerning contraceptives.22  Unlike Martin and Schneider, the 
relevant ordinance in Bolger was content-based and thus not analyzed as 
a time, place, and manner restriction;23 nonetheless, the Court 
importantly emphasized the ability of the homeowner to reject the 
leaflets.24  As in Martin, the Court put the burden on the homeowner to 
reject the leaflets, holding that the homeowner may opt out of further 
mailings.25  The Court reasoned that homeowners are not a “‘captive’ 
audience”26 and “may ‘effectively avoid further bombardment of their 
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.’”27  The Court further found 
that the homeowner can simply throw the leaflets away because “‘the 
short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can . . . is an 
acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned.’”28 
Although the aforementioned Supreme Court decisions all struck 
 16. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943). 
 17. See id. at 144 (“Ordinances of the sort now before us may be aimed at the protection of the 
householders from annoyance, including intrusion upon the hours of rest, and at the prevention of 
crime.”). 
 18. Id. at 146. 
 19. Id. at 147–48 (“We know of no state which . . . makes a person a criminal trespasser if he 
enters the property of another for an innocent purpose without an explicit command from the owners to 
stay away.”). 
 20. Id. at 148. 
 21. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
 22. Id. at 61. 
 23. Id. at 68 (analyzing the issue as commercial speech) (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 477 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
 24. Id. at 72. 
 25. Id. (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970)). 
 26. Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980)). 
 27. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)) (citation 
omitted). 
 28. Id. (citation omitted). 
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down the respective ordinances, in 1984, the Court upheld an ordinance 
that prohibited the placing of signs on utility poles in Members of City 
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent.29  In Taxpayers for Vincent, the city 
argued that the prevention of litter and visual blight justified the 
ordinance.30  The Court agreed and held that cities “have a weighty, 
essentially esthetic interest in proscribing intrusive and unpleasant 
formats for expression,”31 and “the visual assault on the citizens . . . by 
an accumulation of signs . . . constitutes a significant substantive evil 
within the City’s power to prohibit.”32  The Court further held that the 
ordinance was narrowly tailored, distinguishing Schneider and rejecting 
the notion that the city must resort to general anti-littering laws.33  The 
Court reasoned that Schneider involved the right to “communicate 
directly with a willing listener,” while speakers, who post signs on 
utility poles, communicate indirectly because they are not present when 
the speech is communicated to the listener.34  The Court further noted 
that an anti-littering law would only serve to punish leaflets that fall to 
the ground, but would not remedy the visual blight created by the actual 
posting of signs.35 
The aforementioned cases show that the Supreme Court has indeed 
stressed the broad scope of the First Amendment and provided the 
speaker with vast protection to distribute literature.  The Court struck 
down ordinances that banned leafleting directly to persons in the street, 
leafleting homes, and leafleting through the mail.  However, as 
Taxpayers for Vincent demonstrates, speakers do not have unlimited 
rights, and local governments may restrict the distribution of literature in 
appropriate contexts. 
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A circuit split has developed over the interpretation and applicability 
of the aforementioned Supreme Court precedent to windshield 
leafleting.  The Sixth Circuit, in Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg,36 upheld a 
ban on windshield leafleting,37 citing Taxpayers for Vincent, rather than 
 29. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984). 
 30. See id. at 805–07. 
 31. Id. at 806. 
 32. Id. at 807. 
 33. Id. at 809–10. 
 34. Id. at 810. 
 35. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810. 
 36. 409 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 37. Id. at 262. 
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Schneider, as the controlling case.38  In contrast, the Seventh, Eighth, 
and Ninth Circuits applied Schneider to strike down such bans as 
unconstitutional.39  Both sides of the split considered Bolger, but applied 
it differently.40 
This Part further surveys the circuit split.  Subsection A discusses the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Jobe while subsection B discusses the three 
circuit decisions that struck down windshield leafleting bans, focusing 
on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Horina v. Granite City.41 
A. Ban on Windshield Leafleting Upheld 
The Sixth Circuit stands alone in holding that bans on windshield 
leafleting are constitutional.  In 2005, the Sixth Circuit upheld a city ban 
on windshield leafleting in Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg.42  The ordinance 
stated: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to place or deposit or in any manner to 
affix or cause to be placed or deposited or affixed to any automobile or 
other vehicle or other automotive vehicle, any handbill, sign, poster, 
advertisement, or notice of any kind whatsoever, unless he be the owner 
thereof, or without first having secured in writing the consent of the 
owner thereof.43 
The court analyzed the ordinance as a time, place, and manner 
restriction.44  Time, place, and manner restrictions must (1) be content-
neutral, (2) serve a significant government interest, (3) be narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and (4) leave open 
ample alternative channels of communication.45  Because the ordinance 
did not consider the content of the speech, the court focused on the last 
three requirements.46 
Regarding the second element, the government argued that the 
 38. See id. at 268–71. 
 39. See Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160 F.3d 1214, 1222 (8th Cir. 1998); Horina v. Granite 
City, 538 F.3d 624, 638 (7th Cir. 2008); Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 40. See, e.g., Krantz, 160 F.3d at 1221; Jobe, 409 F.3d at 271. 
 41. 538 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 42. Jobe, 409 F.3d at 262. 
 43. Id. at 263. 
 44. Id. at 267 (holding that the issue did not fall under the public forum doctrine because vehicles 
parked on the streets are not a setting that “deal[s] with a method of communication for which one can 
say there has been a ‘traditional right of access’ and in neither instance does it offer an apt analogy to the 
forms of communication that have long taken our place on our ‘public streets and parks’” (quoting U.S. 
Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981))). 
 45. Id. at 267 (citations omitted). 
 46. See id. at 268. 
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ordinance furthered two significant interests: litter prevention and the 
protection of private property.47  The Sixth Circuit agreed that common 
sense supported both interests, in part because thirty-eight other cities 
had similar laws.48  Thus, the court did not require the city to proffer its 
own independent evidence, but rather allowed it to rely on other cities’ 
past evidence and judgment.49  The court also noted that windshield 
leafleting “shares as many qualities with littering as placing the fliers on 
the front lawn of a residence, on the top of a boat or . . . any piece of 
private property that is not otherwise designed by intent or usage to 
receive and hold literature distributed by others.”50 
Discussing the third element, the court held that the ordinance 
burdened no more speech than necessary and compared the issue to that 
in Taxpayers for Vincent, which upheld a ban on placing signs on utility 
poles.51  The court reasoned that leaflets on windshields are analogous 
to signs on utility poles in that the visual blight “‘is created by the 
medium of expression itself.’”52  The court noted that Schneider, 
contrarily, only involved leaflets that fell to the ground, a littering 
problem caused by the “‘by-product of the activity.’”53  Thus, the court 
concluded that the ordinance “targeted the precise problems—littering 
on private automobiles and unauthorized use of private property—that it 
wished to c 54
The plaintiff disagreed and, drawing support from Schneider, argued 
that the city could control littering through general anti-littering laws.55  
The court distinguished Schneider because Schneider did not consider 
the private property interests of the recipient.56  Additionally, the court 
reasoned that “‘[t]he right recognized in Schneider . . . is to tender the 
written material to the passerby who may reject it or accept it.’”57  
Emphasizing that absent vehicle owners have “no choice in receiving the 
literature, no choice in accepting the burden of disposing of it, and no 
 47. Jobe, 409 F.3d at 268. 
 48. Id. at 269.  The ordinances existed in several small cities, as well as large cities such as 
Atlanta, Philadelphia, Charlotte, Portland, and San Antonio.  Id. at 265.  Additionally, New York 
instituted a state-wide ban.  Id. 
 49. Id. at 269–70. 
 50. Id. at 273–74. 
 51. Id. at 269. 
 52. Id. (quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810 (1984)). 
 53. Jobe, 409 F.3d at 269 (quoting Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 270 (citing Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939)). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 271 (emphasis added) (quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 
U.S. 789, 809–10 (1984)). 
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e a vehicular sandwich board for another citizen’s 
e very cheapness of a mode of communication may lead to 
its
 
choice in peeling it off the windshield after a rain shower,” the court 
found that the current ordinance did not prohibit the traditional leafleting 
right recognized in Schneider.58 
The plaintiff argued that vehicle owners could reject the leaflets by 
placing a “No Solicitation” sign on the windshield, comparing the 
burden to a “do-not-call” or “do-not-spam list.”59  The court rejected 
this argument because, unlike e-mail or the telephone, a windshield is 
not a traditional method of communication, and a “No Solicitation” sign 
is an “unorthodox burden” to place on vehicle owners.60  Furthermore, 
the court disagreed that vehicle owners should have the burden of 
looking away or discarding the leaflet, as in Bolger.61  The cou
soned that: 
[A]lthough the ‘short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash 
can . . . is an acceptable burden’ to place on mailbox owners, that burden 
stems from an individual’s choice to erect a mailbox.  In marked contrast, 
parking a car on a public street is not an invitation to place literature on 
the car . . . or to becom
message of the day.62 
Regarding the final element, the court held that the ordinance leaves 
the speaker with several other channels of communication,63 such as 
door-to-door distribution, securely placing leaflets on porches, mailing, 
and person-to-person leafleting—including direct distribution to those 
who return to their cars.64  However, the plaintiff argued that the 
aforementioned methods are not nearly as efficient in reaching residents 
who come downtown.65  The court responded that, although the 
Supreme Court is sensitive to cheap and efficient methods of 
communication, “‘this solicitude has practical boundaries,’”66 and “[a]t 
some point, th
 abuse.”67 
Therefore, the court upheld the ban as a valid time, place, and manner 
restriction.68  The court held that the ordinance burdened no more 
 58. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 59. Jobe, 409 F.3d at 272. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 270–71. 
 62. Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983)). 
 63. Id. at 270. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Jobe, 409 F.3d at 272. 
 66. Id. (quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 n.30 
(1984)). 
 67. Id. at 273. 
 68. Id. at 262. 
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 the ordinance left speakers with other suitable methods 
to deliver their message.69 
B. Ban on Windshield Leafleting Is Unconstitutional 
and 2009, 
re
the court analyzed the ordinance as a time, 
pla
ng showing that the restriction 
actually serves a government interest.”79 
speech than necessary to prevent litter and protect private property 
interests and that
The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits each struck down ordinances 
prohibiting windshield leafleting.70  The Eighth Circuit first ruled on the 
issue in 1998 when it decided Krantz v. City of Fort Smith,71 a decision 
that preceded the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Jobe.  However, the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits did not join the split until 2008 
spectively, both after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Jobe.72 
The Seventh Circuit, in Horina v. Granite City,73 held that a ban on 
windshield leafleting violates the First Amendment.74  The ordinance 
stated, “[n]o person shall deposit or throw any handbill in or upon any 
vehicle.”75  As in Jobe, 
ce, and manner restriction.76 
The court accepted that litter prevention and the protection of private 
property can be significant government interests but required “‘evidence 
supporting [the government’s] proffered justification.’”77  The court 
stated that the government does not have to produce “a panoply of 
‘empirical studies, testimony, police records, [or] reported injuries,’”78 
but it “must nevertheless proffer somethi
 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160 F.3d 1214, 1222 (8th Cir. 1998); Horina v. Granite 
, lein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 
th Cr. 1998). 
 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2008); Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 
3d 1 9). 
placing any handbill 
eyond the scope of this Article. 
ned 
ehicl e not nonpublic fora). 
City 538 F.3d 624, 638 (7th Cir. 2008); K
2009). 
 71. 160 F.3d 1214 (8
 72. See Horina v. Granite City, 538
F. 196 (9th Cir. 200
 73. 538 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 74. Id. at 638. 
 75. Id. at 628.  The court also struck down another ordinance that prohibited 
on any unoccupied private property.  Id.  However, because this ordinance is much broader than the 
current issue, the constitutional analysis would be b
 76. Id. (concluding that the public forum analysis does not apply because privately ow
v es parked on streets ar
 77. Id. at 633 (quoting Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
 78. Id. at 633. 
 79. Horina, 538 F.3d at 634 (emphasis in original) (citing Weinberg, 310 F.3d at 1039; Watseka 
v. Ill. Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1556 (7th Cir. 1986)).  See Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160 
F.3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[D]efendants must demonstrate the existence of a ‘reasonable fit’ 
between their asserted goal and the means that they have selected to accomplish it.” (quoting Cincinnati 
v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 416 (1993))); Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1202 
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Relying primarily on the statistic that thirty-eight other cities have 
similar laws, the government argued that common sense is sufficient to 
prove its interests.80  The court rejected this argument, reasoning that 
other cities’ ordinances do not show that the problem is present in that 
city.81  The court also reasoned that a common sense explanation “can 
all-too-easily be used to mark unsupported conjecture.”82  The court 
further noted that, even if the government proffered sufficient evidence, 
the ordinance was not narrowly tailored.83  Analogizing the case to 
Schneider, the court found that the government’s interests could be 
effectively addressed using traditional anti-littering and trespass laws.84 
Lastly, the court held that the ordinance did not leave open ample 
alternative methods of communication, rejecting both the use of the mail 
and person-to-person distribution as suitable alternatives.85  The court 
emphasized that cheaper forms of expression have been given “‘special 
solicitude.’”86  Furthermore, the court noted that person-to-person 
distribution “is extremely time consuming and burdensome, particularly 
when the individual intends to convey a message to people who park 
their automobiles in a certain area of the city or who live in a certain 
neighborhood.”87  The court next found the use of the mail too 
expensive88 and ineffective at reaching those who park at a particular 
location.89  In summary, the court struck down the ordinance for failing 
the second, third, and fourth elements of the time, place, and manner 
analysis.90 
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits invalidated similar bans and advanced 
the same general reasoning as the Seventh Circuit in Horina.  The Ninth 
Circuit, in Klein v. Clemente,91 placed additional emphasis on the rights 
 
(9th Cir. 2009) (Local governments must “show some nexus between leaflets placed on vehicles and a 
resulting substantial increase in litter on the streets before we could find that the City’s asserted interest 
in preventing littering on the street justifies a prohibition on placing leaflets on windshields.”). 
 80. Horina, 538 F.3d at 633–34. 
 81. Id. at 634. 
 82. Id. at 633 (citations omitted). 
 83. Id. at 634. 
 84. Id. at 635 (citations omitted). 
 85. Id. at 635–36. 
 86. Horina, 538 F.3d at 635 (quoting Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 906 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 n.30 (1984))). 
 87. Id. at 636. 
 88. Id. (citing Gresham, 225 F.3d at 906; Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812 n.30). 
 89. Id. (citing Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1040 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[A]n 
alternative is not adequate if it ‘forecloses a speaker’s ability to reach one audience even if it allows the 
speaker to reach other groups.’” (quoting Gresham, 225 F.3d at 907))). 
 90. Id. at 638. 
 91. 584 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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t found that vehicle owners are not a “captive audience”  and 
may simply look away or place a “No Solicitation” sign on their 
vehicle.96 
ns are 
co
Finally, Subsection C argues that direct distribution to 
 
and burdens of the recipient.  The court stressed that the ordinance 
punished vehicle owners who may want to receive the leaflets, 
commenting that “the ‘right to distribute literature . . . necessarily 
protects the right to receive it.’”92  The court placed the burden on the 
recipient to throw the leaflet in the trash.93  Thus, the court took the 
opposite interpretation of Bolger than the Sixth Circuit in Jobe, arguing 
that “[j]ust as the ‘short though regular, journey from mail box to trash 
can . . . is an acceptable burden,’ . . . so the burden on recipients of 
disposing of unwanted leaflets cannot justify hampering speech.”94  The 
Ninth Circuit recognized that recipients must have the ability to reject 
speech, bu 95
IV. DISCUSSION 
Similar to the Sixth Circuit, this Part argues that bans on windshield 
leafleting are constitutional.  As highlighted above, the circuit split is 
caused by conflicting interpretations of three key issues within the time, 
place, and manner framework: (1) what evidence is required to justify a 
government’s significant interests in litter prevention and the protection 
of private property; (2) whether, in light of Schneider and other Supreme 
Court precedent, bans on windshield leafleting are narrowly tailored; 
and (3) whether adequate alternative channels of communication remain 
for the speaker.  This Part does not discuss whether such ba
ntent-neutral because all four circuits unanimously held that bans on 
windshield leafleting do not consider the content of the speech.97 
Subsection A argues that common sense is sufficient to justify the 
government’s interests in preventing litter and protecting private 
property, and that a government may rely on other cities’ evidence.  
Subsection B argues that bans on windshield leafleting are narrowly 
tailored.  
 92. Id. at 1204 (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1204–05 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983)). 
 95. Klein, 584 F.3d at 1204 n.6 (quoting Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72). 
 96. Id. at 1205 (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970)). 
 97. Id. at 1201 (“The parties agree that the ordinance is content-neutral, so the first prong of the 
traditional ‘time, place, and manner’ inquiry is not at issue in this case.”); Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 
409 F.3d 261, 268 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The law does not draw distinctions based on the topic of speech at 
issue or the point of view of the speaker.”); Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160 F.3d 1214, 1219 (8th Cir. 
1998); Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 639 (7th Cir. 2008) (Manion, J., dissenting) (“It is 
undisputed that the Ordinance is content-neutral.”). 
10
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passersby and hom ves to windshield 
leafleting. 
 evidence that littering is a problem in that 
pa
 “the accumulated, commonsense judgments of local 
law
 ground.  Additionally, “[w]hile the more thoughtful drivers 
di
City.”103 
A
es are more than adequate alternati
A. Significant Government Interest 
All four circuits generally agree that litter prevention and the 
protection of private property can serve as significant government 
interests.  However, they fundamentally disagree as to whether a local 
government must proffer
rticular city.  The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits require 
independent evidence, while the Sixth Circuit held that a common sense 
explanation is sufficient. 
The Sixth Circuit’s holding is more persuasive.  Common sense is a 
valid tool to judge the constitutionality of a statute and should received 
similar treatment in this context.98  While appropriate in some instances, 
governments should not have to show independent evidence where 
common sense supports their proffered interests.  In Metromedia, Inc. v. 
San Diego, the Supreme Court considered whether a ban on billboards 
directly advanced traffic safety and esthetic interests.99  The Court 
deferred to
makers”100 and held that “[i]t is not speculative to recognize that 
billboards by their very nature . . . can be perceived as an ‘esthetic 
harm.’”101 
Common sense and daily experience show that litter prevention and 
the protection of private property are significant government interests in 
any city.  Windshield leafleting, by its “very nature,”102 impedes the 
aforementioned interests.  Vehicles are not designed to serve as bulletin 
boards, and, whether by wind, rain, or simply gravity, leaflets may easily 
fall to the
spose of such flyers properly, common sense tells us that at least some 
of the unwanted flyers become litter, even without evidence from the 
 government’s interest in preventing litter embodies a secondary 
 
 98. See Anderson v. Milwaukee County, 433 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Common sense 
must not be and should not be suspended when judging the constitutionality of a rule or statute.”). 
 99. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
 100. Id. at 509 (emphasis added). See also Multimedia Publ’g Co. v. Greenville–Spartanburg 
p  [its] interests, the [city] need not have 
ddu ic factual evidence that its interests were advance by the ban . . . ; it was entitled to 
dva itted). 
Air ort Dist., 991 F.2d 154, 160–61 (4th Cir. 1993) (“To advance
a ced specif
a nced its interest by arguments based on appeals to common sense and logic.”) (citations om
 101. Metromedia, Inc., 452 U.S. at 510 (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 640 (7th Cir. 2008) (Manion, J., dissenting). 
11
Bickel: WINDSHIELD LEAFLETING ORDINANCES: A PERMISSIBLE USE OF LOCAL GOVE
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
BICKEL FINAL FORMAT (Paginated) 3/28/2011  7:48:57 AM 
760 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
windshields 
are
ndshield wipers.  
Ju
windshield wiper until after 
interest in preventing visual blight.104  Thus, even if leaflets remain 
affixed to vehicles and do not fall to the ground, the resulting visual 
blight justifies city action.  If signs on utility poles cause sufficient 
visual blight to justify a city ban,105 then the same common sense 
justification applies to leaflets on windshields; leaflets on 
 as significant an eyesore as signs posted on utility poles. 
With regard to private property interests, it is hardly speculative to 
conclude that upon returning to their cars, many vehicle owners would 
be displeased to find a leaflet pinned under their wi
stice Manion, dissenting in Horina, commented that: 
It would be the rare driver indeed who has not experienced the intrusion 
of a flyer placed under a car windshield and the annoyance of removing 
the flyer, especially in inclement weather or when the driver doesn’t 
notice it tucked under the passenger side 
fastening his seatbelt and starting his car.106 
Evidence of other cities’ windshield leafleting bans further supports a 
common sense justification.  When the Sixth Circuit decided Jobe, 
thirty-eight other cities had laws banning windshield leafleting.107  In 
Horina, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s reliance on other 
cities’ laws on grounds that a city must prove that the problem exists in 
that particular city.  However, both the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme 
Court agree that a government may rely on another government’s 
findings.  In Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., the Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance affecting adult 
theaters.108  The Court found that the city “was entitled to rely on the 
experiences . . . of other cities”109 and did not have to produce evidence 
“specifically relating to [its] ‘particular problems or needs.’”110  
Furthermore, “[t]he First Amendment does not require a city . . . to 
conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already 
generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies 
upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city 
addresses.”111  Similarly, in Metromedia, discussed earlier, the Court 
 
 104. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993) (analyzing the government’s 
interest in preventing “visual blight caused by littering”); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill 
Architectural Comm’n, 847 F. Supp. 178, 193 (D. Mass. 1994) (noting that “to regulate littering” is “to 
regulate [a] form[ ] of visual blight”), rev’d on other grounds, 100 F.3d 175 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 105. See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816–17 (1984). 
 106. Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 640 (7th Cir. 2008) (Manion, J., dissenting). 
 107. Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d 261, 269 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 108. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 41 (1986). 
 109. Id. at 51. 
 110. Id. at 50 (citation omitted). 
 111. Id. at 51–52. 
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at San Diego had an esthetic interest in restricting billboards 
lar
tion, recognizing that litter prevention and the protection of 
pr
t, local lawmakers should establish evidence of 
lit
found th
gely based on evidence that other states and municipalities had similar 
laws.112 
In the current context, a common sense approach is essential because 
it may be impossible to collect evidence of littering and invasion of 
private property.  Complaints are potentially the only type of 
independent, direct evidence that a city can proffer, and they are likely 
to be small in number, if present at all.  Without a common sense 
justifica
ivate property are significant interests would only be realizable in 
theory. 
In review, Supreme Court precedent clearly shows that common sense 
can justify a government’s interests, especially when numerous other 
cities have passed similar laws.  Because a significant number of cities 
have banned windshield leafleting,113 a local government should not 
have to offer independent evidence to justify such a ban.  Nevertheless, 
this Comment recognizes that, given the adverse holdings of the 
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, local governments should take the 
safe route and not assume all courts will share the views of the Sixth 
Circuit.  As a resul
tering and private property invasions prior to enacting a windshield 
leafleting ordinance. 
The evidence required to satisfy the adverse view is unclear.  The 
Eight Circuit in Krantz found complaints from vehicle owners 
insufficient;114 similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Klein held that “preventing 
a marginal quantity of litter” is insufficient, and the city must show that 
windshield leafleting “creates an abundance of litter significantly 
beyond the amount the City already manages to clean up.”115  On the 
other hand, the Seventh Circuit in Horina noted that a city does not have 
to “produce a panoply of ‘empirical studies, testimony, police records, 
[or] reported injuries,’”116 and Justice Manion, in dissent, suggested that 
a city could provide “a statement by a police officer, street cleaner, or 
 
 112. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) (“San Diego, like many States and 
the ce of” billboards. (footnote omitted)). 
cement of 
and
r. 2009) (emphasis added). 
33 (7th Cir. 2008). 
o r municipalities, has chosen to minimize the presen
 113. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 114. Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 1650 F.3d 1214, 1221–22 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[N]otwithstanding 
defendants’ evidence that government officials received complaints about handbills left on cars and that 
the ordinances were enacted for the purposes of preventing litter, defendants have not established a 
factual basis for concluding that a cause-and-effect relationship actually exists between the pla
h bills on parked cars and litter that impacts the [public welfare] of the defendant cities.”). 
 115. Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Ci
 116. Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 6
13
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,  local lawmakers 
would probably be safe presenting evidence from street cleaners, 
documented citizen comp s. 
g.  The second issue is the appropriate burden to 
place on the recipient to reject the leaflets.  The following subsections 
a
1. Schneider Does Not Require the Use of General Anti-Littering and 
he Seventh Circuit 
ap
other witness with first-hand knowledge” of the problem.117  Given the 
aforementioned standards, and because the decision in Krantz precedes 
the recent trend of windshield leafleting litigation 118
laints, or police officer
B. Narrowly Tailored 
Two issues have confounded circuit courts under the ‘narrowly 
tailored’ analysis.  The first issue is whether Schneider requires 
governments to use anti-littering and trespass laws rather than ban 
windshield leafletin
ddress each issue. 
Trespass Laws in the Windshield Leafleting Context 
As mentioned earlier, in Schneider the Supreme Court struck down an 
ordinance that prohibited leafleting on public streets,119 emphasizing 
that a general anti-littering ordinance could adequately serve the 
government’s interest in preventing littering.120  T
plied this principle in Horina.121  In contrast, the Sixth Circuit 
persuasively distinguished Schneider from Jobe.122 
Schneider involved person-to-person leafleting, and each recipient 
had the present ability to reject the speech.  Vehicle owners, absent from 
their vehicles, do not have the same opportunity because “the driver is 
unknown and the receptacle is mobile and lacks the ability to accept or 
reject the handbill.”123  An argument can be made that vehicle owners 
have the ability to reject leaflets using a “No Solicitation” sign, and as a 
result, the activity would fall within the Schneider holding.  However, 
 
 117. Id. at 640 n.5 (Manion, J., dissenting). 
 118. Krantz was decided in 1998, while Jobe, Horina, and Klein were decided in 2005, 2008, and 
2009, respectively. 
 119. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939). 
 120. Id. at 162. 
 121. Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 635 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 122. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 123. Horina, 538 F.3d at 639 n.3 (Manion, J., dissenting) (The ordinance “does not restrict 
traditional leafleting, which, as the court notes, is the offering of written materials to individuals in 
public places for their acceptance or rejection. . . .  Rather, [the ordinance] prohibits the leaving of 
handbills on automobiles; with an automobile, the driver is unknown and the receptacle is mobile and 
lacks the ability to accept or reject the handbill.”). 
14
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e purpose to keep the streets 
cle
se a practice has increased in volume, 
ho
, windshield 
leafleting does not necessarily fall under the right recognized in 
Schneider ution to 
people nor are vehicles “
permit the government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless the 
“captive” audience cannot avoid objectionable speech.’”128  The Court 
requiring vehicle owners to post a “No Solicitation” sign is a much 
higher burden than that imposed in Schneider, which merely required a 
passerby to say “no.”  Even if a burden can be placed on the vehicle 
owner to reject the leaflet, the current issue should fall outside the 
specific holding of Schneider—that “th
an and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance 
which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing 
literature to one willing to receive it.”124 
Additionally, the Schneider Court emphasized that “the streets are 
natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and 
opinion . . . .”125  Parked vehicles are on the streets, but are in no way 
“natural” places to convey ideas.  Though police officers typically use a 
windshield to issue parking tickets, this comparison begs a different 
analysis because an improperly parked vehicle has broken the law.  
Additionally, as demonstrated by the recent increase in windshield 
leafleting litigation, windshield leafleting has become increasingly 
common.126  Merely becau
wever, in no way speaks to its legality, or more specifically, 
establishes it as “natural and proper . . . for the dissemination of 
information and opinion.”127 
Thus while Schneider established the right to leaflet
.  The current issue neither involves direct distrib
natural” receptacles for literature. 
2. The Appropriate Burden to Place on the Recipient 
Because the principle from Schneider—that a general anti-littering or 
trespass ordinance could address the problem—does not apply, the issue 
becomes the appropriate burden to place on the vehicle owner.  In 
Bolger, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he First Amendment ‘does not 
 
 124. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162 (emphasis added). 
 leafleting has taken place in the past twelve 
e past five years. 
 60, 72 (1983) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 
 125. Id. at 163 (emphasis added). 
 126. The Eight Circuit first addressed windshield leafleting in 1998.  Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 
160 F.3d 1214 (8th Cir. 1998).  After a seven year lull, the Sixth Circuit ruled on the issue in 2005, with 
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits doing so in 2008 and 2009, respectively.  Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 
409 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2005); Horina, 538 F.3d at 624; Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196 
(9th Cir. 2009).  Thus, all of the litigation on windshield
years, with all but one case decided in th
 127. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163. 
 128. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S.
15
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st a “No 
So
ists to receive 
inf
retically sufficient, and a reasonable 
ve
e, but such awareness does not create 
 
found that a mail recipient is not a captive audience and placed the 
burden on the recipient to opt out of unsolicited mailings.129  In addition, 
in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 
the Court placed the burden on the homeowner to po
licitation” sign to reject door-to-door leaflet distributors.130 
The Eighth Circuit in Klein similarly determined that a vehicle owner 
is not a captive audience and placed the burden on the vehicle owner to 
place a “No Solicitation” sign on the dashboard.131  However, as the 
Sixth Circuit in Jobe more persuasively noted, placing the burden on a 
vehicle owner to post a sign is an “unorthodox burden.”132  The 
difference lies in the nature of a door and a mailbox as modes of 
communication; both methods are express invitations to reach a 
homeowner, or at the very least are traditional methods of reaching a 
homeowner.  For example, a sidewalk typically leads to a door, where 
ringing a doorbell can summon a homeowner, and thus invites visitors.  
Similarly, a mailbox, by its very nature, is an invitation to send 
information.  In contrast, a vehicle in no way invites a speaker to place a 
leaflet under its windshield wiper.  While a mailbox ex
ormation, a vehicle exists to provide transportation.133 
Putting the burden on a vehicle owner to post a sign on the dashboard 
is both absurd and without merit.  It is reasonable to assume that very 
few vehicle owners, even if adamantly opposed to windshield leafleting, 
will place an unsightly sign on their dashboard.  Thus, the concept of a 
“No Solicitation” sign is only theo
hicle owner is without recourse. 
As previously mentioned, windshield leafleting is increasing in 
popularity.  Each vehicle owner is likely aware of the risk that someone 
will place a leaflet on their windshield.  Nevertheless, mere awareness is 
not an invitation.  To illustrate, albeit in a more dramatic scenario, a 
homeowner may move into a crime-ridden area aware of the risk that an 
intruder may break into their hom
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980)). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 168 (2002) 
(citing Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 639 (1980) (“[T]he provision permitting 
homeowners to bar solicitors from their property by posting [no solicitation] signs . . . suggest[s] the 
availability of less intrusive and more effective measures to protect privacy.”)). 
 131. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 132. Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d 261, 272 (6th Cir. 2005) (Windshield leafleting 
unjustly “put[s] the vehicle owner to the choice of accepting either a ridiculous requirement (removing 
the windshield wipers) or an unorthodox burden (placing a ‘No Handbills, No Posters . . .’ sign on the 
dashboard).”). 
 133. See id. (“Unlike a telephone, a mailbox, a computer or the well-trodden path to the front 
door, the windshield wiper does not exist, formally or informally, to encourage communication.”). 
16
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an
dshield leafleting, while allowing 
other types of leafleting. 
C. Ample Alternative Channels 
to reach those who park in a specific area of a city or 
ne
t and 
le
 
 invitation to break and enter. 
In conclusion, Schneider does not require a government to use anti-
littering and trespass laws in lieu of a windshield leafleting ban, and it is 
inappropriate to place the burden on the vehicle owner to post a sign to 
opt out of leaflet solicitations.  The holding by the Sixth Circuit in Jobe 
is more persuasive.  The court in Jobe held that the ordinance was 
narrowly tailored because it “targeted the precise problems—littering on 
private automobiles and unauthorized use of private property—that it 
wished to correct.”134  In Metromedia, Inc., the Supreme Court used a 
similar analysis, noting that “the most direct and perhaps the only 
effective approach” is to prohibit billboards.135  The Court emphasized 
that, because the ordinance did not prohibit all billboards, the city went 
“no further than necessary” and actually “stopped short of fully 
accomplishing its ends.”136  As in Metromedia, Inc., the most direct and 
only effective approach to both prevent littering and protect private 
property interests is to prohibit win
A leafleting ordinance must leave the speaker with adequate 
alternative methods of communication.137  Each circuit addressed the 
use of the mail, door-to-door leafleting, and person-to-person leafleting 
as possible adequate alternatives to windshield leafleting.  While the 
Sixth Circuit in Jobe found all of the aforementioned alternatives 
adequate,138 the Seventh Circuit rejected them.139  The Seventh Circuit 
argued that the alternatives are time-consuming, burdensome, and do not 
allow the speaker 
ighborhood.140 
The Ninth Circuit reasonably rejected using the mail as a suitable 
alternative to windshield leafleting.  In addition to the expense of 
stamps, collecting the addresses of the target audience is overly tedious 
and burdensome.  Direct distribution to persons in the stree
afleting at homes, however, are more than adequate alternatives. 
There are two relevant contexts where speakers typically windshield 
 134. Id. at 269. 
 135. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508 (1981). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. at 516. 
 138. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying test. 
 140. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text. 
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 for invalidating door-to-door leafleting as an adequate 
alt
f leaflets to travel a short 
dis
of a method “has practical boundaries.”145  As discussed, within their 
leaflet: (1) along the streets of a neighborhood—where homes line the 
streets—and (2) along the streets of an inner city—where homes do not 
line the streets.  First, in the neighborhood context, door-to-door 
leafleting may actually be a superior method to windshield leafleting.  
The Supreme Court has recognized that “the most effective way of 
bringing [leaflets] to the notice of individuals is their distribution at the 
homes of the people.”141  Moving from door to door may take more time 
than simply strolling down the street from vehicle to vehicle, but the 
additional burden is insignificant.  A distributor may elect to leave the 
leaflet on the front porch because several state laws suggest that 
speakers may securely fasten leaflets to a front porch.142  Such a strategy 
also allows speakers to reach homeowners that are not home.  Thus, the 
travel time, while requiring an additional walk up the sidewalk, is not a 
viable basis
ernative. 
Second, in the city context, streets are lined with parked vehicles, but 
few homes are present.  In such cases, while distribution to homeowners 
may not reach the desired audience, direct distribution to persons in the 
streets should suffice.  Person-to-person distribution may require the 
expenditure of a great deal of time if the area is not frequently trafficked.  
However, it is reasonable to ask a distributor o
tance to find a more advantageous location. 
In Taxpayers for Vincent, the Supreme Court upheld a ban on signs 
on utility poles because the speaker could still “distribute literature in 
the same place where the posting of signs on public property is 
prohibited.”143  The same situation presents itself with regard to 
windshield leafleting.  Speakers may not windshield leaflet, but they 
may distribute at that exact location, whether it be to persons walking on 
the adjacent sidewalk or homes that line the street.  Moreover, 
alternatives do not have to be equivalent or superior to windshield 
leaflets, but rather need only be “adequate.”144  Further, the superiority 
 
 141. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939). 
 142. See Van Nuys Publ’g Co., Inc. v. City of Thousand Oaks, 489 P.2d 809, 817 (Cal. 1971) 
(striking down an ordinance that prohibited fastening leaflets on doorsteps or porches); Statesboro 
bl
the distribution of leaflets on porches). 
Pu ’g Co. v. City of Sylvania, 516 S.E.2d 296, 299 (Ga. 1999) (striking down an ordinance that 
prohibited 
 143. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 792 (1984) (footnote 
omitted). 
 144. Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 635 (7th Cir. 2008) (“An adequate alternative does not 
have to be the speaker’s first or best choice . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 145. Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d 261, 272 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Taxpayers for 
Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812 n.30).  See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88–89 (1949) (“That more people 
18
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given contexts, both visiting homes in neighborhoods and direct 
distribution to passersby in the city are more than adequate alternatives 
to windshield leafleting. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the First Amendment carries significant force, the law shifts in 
favor of allowing bans on windshield leafleting.  Local governments 
have the power to maintain an esthetically pleasing landscape and to 
protect the property of its citizens.  Local governments should not have 
to proffer independent evidence in support of these interests, as common 
sense provides adequate justification in this context.  However, to play it 
safe, a legislature should establish independent supporting evidence 
regardless of whether common sense is sufficient.  Proving a significant 
government interest is the second prong in the time, place, and manner 
analysis, and a critical judiciary should not be provided an opportunity 
to easily dismiss the claim. 
Additionally, bans on windshield leaflets are narrowly tailored 
because Schneider does not require local governments to resort to 
general trespass and anti-littering laws, and it is inappropriate to place 
the burden on vehicle owners to post a “No Solicitation” sign.  Lastly, 
the speaker has ample alternative channels for communication.  Whether 
in a neighborhood or in the city, the speaker may directly distribute to 
individual homes or to passersby. 
Sister circuits should heed the Sixth Circuit’s lead and uphold bans on 
windshield leafleting.  Although recent jurisprudence is trending in the 
opposite direction, eight circuits, and most importantly, the Supreme 
Court, have yet to rule on the issue.  If the recent trend does not reverse, 
vehicle owners will be subject to the needling annoyance and invasion 
of personal property that windshield leafleting entails, and local 
governments will be powerless to protect the esthetics of the city and the 
rights of its citizens in an efficient manner. 
may be more easily and cheaply reached by sound trucks . . . is not enough to call forth constitutional 
protection for what those charged with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means 
of publicity are open.”). 
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